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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature ofthe Case
Appellant Teufel Nursery, Inc. ("Teufel") maintains the Statement of the Case previously
submitted in Appellant's Brief filed April 12, 2013. 1

However, since the filing of the

Appellant's Brief, the District Court has entered an amended judgment and several other
judgments that are directly related to this appeal, so this Reply Brief will address the additional
proceedings that have taken place since the filing of Appellant's Brief.

B. Course of Proceedings
Teufel restates its Course of Proceedings previously filed, and includes and incorporates
the following additional infonnation.
On April 12, 2013, Teufel filed its Appellant's Brief. Credit Suisse filed its Respondent's
Brief on June 6, 2013.

In the meantime, Credit Suisse also sought to amend the Second

Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale?

Credit

Suisse filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Amend Second Amended Revised
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale on March 28,2013, (R., Vol. II, pp. 190191) along with a memorandum in support. (R., Vol. II, pp. 192-197) A hearing was scheduled
on the matter on May 23,2013, on the Motion for Relief, among other motions.
On May 24, 2013, at the District Court's request, Teufel filed its Response to Motion to
Amend Second Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of
Sale.

(R., Vol. II, pp. 198-201) Teufel did not oppose the amendment, but merely stated

1 As mentioned in the Appellant's Brief, this appeal deals with the failed resort known as Tamarack Resort
("Tamarack Resort") and its developer, Tamarack Resort, LLC ("Tamarack").
2 The Second Amended Second Revised Judgment of Foreclosure and Order of Sale, filed June 18,2012, was the
main underlying basis for this appeal. (R., pp. 4236-4387).
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Teufel's position that the District Court had the authority to amend the judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) rather than this Court's remittitur granting the District Court
jurisdiction to enter additional judgments relating to the Tamarack litigation. (R., Vol. II, pp.
198-201) On May 28, 2013, Credit Suisse filed its Reply to Teufel's Response to Motion to
Amend, essentially agreeing with Teufel's position. (R., Vol. II, pp. 202-208) On June 4, 2013,
the District Court entered its Decision and Order Re: Teufel's Response to Credit Suisse's
Motion for Relief from the Judgment and To Amend the Second Amended Second Revised
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order for Sale. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-212) The District
Court agreed with Teufel that it had authority to enter the amended judgment pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and granted Credit Suisse's motion. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-212)
Also on June 4, 2013, almost an entire year after the original Second Amended Revised
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale was filed; the District Court entered its
Third Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale. (R.,
Vol. II, pp. 213-386)3 This judgment specifically dealt with the portion of Tamarack Resort that
was initially covered in this appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp. 213-386)4
That same day, the District Court entered four other judgments relating to Tamarack
Resort property encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien.

It entered its Seventh Revised

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Against Tamarack Resort, LLC, and Order of Sale (R., Vol.

3 As previously mentioned, there was no original "Judgment" or "First Amended Judgment" that were ever signed
by the District Court, so the first judgment entered in the case was actually the Second Amended Second Revised
Judgment. The Third Amended Second Revised Judgment was the only amendment to the original judgment that
was appealed in this case.
4 Exhibits A-l, A-2, B-1 and B-3 of both the Second and Third Amended Judgments listed metes and bounds
descriptions and other lot and block legal descriptions that were property subject to Teufel's Claim of Lien.
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II, pp. 387-397)5; the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Against Tamarack
Resort, LLC, and Order of Sale of Lake Wing Property (R., Vol. II, pp. 38-405)6; the Amended
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale of Village Plaza Property (R., Vol. II, pp.
406-415)7; and the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale of the Trillium
Townhome Property. (R., Vol. II, pp. 416-426)8 As with the original judgment that is the subject
of this appeal, these judgments were all entered pursuant to the District Court's findings in the
Substitute Omnibus Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, erroneously setting Teufel's lien
priority date in 2007 rather than 2004, and thus placing Teufel's priority junior to all other lien
claimants, including Credit Suisse.
Teufel timely filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2013. (R., Vol. II, pp.
427-436) The Amended Notice of Appeal incorporated all of the judgments entered by the
District Court on June 4, 2013. These judgments concluded all of the pending priority issues
between Teufel and Credit Suisse that are the basis of this appeal. Consequently, this appeal
should fully resolve all of Teufel's lien priority issues with Credit Suisse, however; if successful
on appeal, Teufel's lien priority issues would need to be revisited on remand with the other
mechanic's lien claimants in the judgments referenced above. 9
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, this appeal presents an interesting dynamic between
questions of fact and law. It is Teufel's position that the District Court made erroneous factual
5 This Judgment gave BAG Properties, LLC lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property
encompassed by the Teufel claim oflien.
6 This Judgment gave MHTN, Inc. lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property encompassed
by the T eutel claim oflien.
7 This Judgment gave BannerlSabbey II, LLC lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property
encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien.
8 This Judgment gave Tamarack Designs, LLC (formerly EZA, P.c. dba OZ Architecture of Boulder's) lien priority
over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien.
9 BAG Properties, LLC, MHTN, Inc., Banner/Sabbey II, LLC, and Tamarack Designs, LLC.
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findings which resulted in it making incorrect conclusions of law when it determined that Credit
Suisse's mortgages had pIioIity over Teufel's claim of lien. This appeal explores those incorrect
factual findings and conclusions of law, which would expectantly result in the reversal of the
District Court's detennination regarding priority between Credit Suisse and Teufel, and a remand
to the DistIict Court to enter judgment accordingly. Fmihermore, now that all judgments have
been entered in this consolidated case, the DistIict Court would also have to determine prioIity
between Teufel and the remaining lien claimants that were granted prioIity over Credit Suisse.
C. Concise Statement of Facts

Teufel reiterates its Concise Statement of Facts in its Appellant's Brief. Because Credit
Suisse did not include a Statement of Facts in its Respondent's Brief, no response is necessary.
The facts relating to specific legal arguments will be addressed later herein.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's Claim of Lien Did Not Have
Priority Over Credit Suisse's Mortgages?
a. Were the District Court's Factual Findings Regarding Teufel's Claim of Lien
Clearly Erroneous?
1.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's work at Tamarack
Resort Was Under Four Separate Contracts and Not a Continuous
Single Contract?

11.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel Only Maintained a
Skeletal Crew and Not Perform Landscaping or Improvements at
Tamarack Resort During the Winter Months or That Snow Removal
Work Was Not Part of the Scope of Work for Teufel's Landscaping
Contract?

h. Based Upon the Factual Findings, Should the District Court's Conclusions of
Law be Reversed?

2.

1.

Did the District Court Incorrectly Determine That Teufel and
Tamarack Were Not Operating Under an Open Account?

11.

Did the District Court Err Ruling That Teufel's Priority Date Was in
2007 and That Credit Suisse's Mortgages Were Prior to Teufel's
Claim of Lien?

Did the District Court Err in Calculating the Lien Amount?
a. Did the District Court Improperly Eliminate a Portion of Teufel's lien
Amount?
b. Did the District Court Err in its Calculation ofInterest?

3.

Did the District Court Err in Apportioning Teufel's Costs and Attorney Fees?
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II.

ARGUMENT

Credit Suisse incorrectly urges this Court to adopt a new rule of law in Idaho for
mechanic's liens.

Specifically, Credit Suisse argues that priority dates for mechanic's liens

relate to the "last time a lien claimant was paid" rather than the long-standing Idaho precedent
requiring priority based upon "first began work on the property."lO Unfortunately, the District
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law indicate that this was the direction the District
Court took in detelmining priority between Credit Suisse and Teufel as well.
Idaho Code § 45-506 grants a mechanic's lien holder a priority date that relates back to
the date materials or improvements were first provided by lien holder. Beall Pipe & Tank

Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 492, 700 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1985).
Essentially, the date of priority of a materialman's lien is the commencement date of the work or
improvement, and has priority over any other lien, including mortgages, tIled or recorded after
that date. White v. Constitution }.1ining and "~1illing Co., 56 Idaho 403,55 P.2d 152 (1936).
Priority between mechanic's liens and other liens is governed by Idaho Code § 45-506
which states, in pertinent part:
The liens provided for in this chapter shall be on equal footing with those liens
within the same class ofliens, without reference to the date of the filing of the lien
claim or claims and are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance,
which may have attached subsequent to the time when the building, improvement
or structure was commenced . ..
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to I.C. § 45-506, a mechanic's lien holder's priority date relates
back to the date materials or improvements were first provided by lien holder. Beall Pipe, 108
Idaho at 492, 700 P.2d at 114.

10

See Respondent's Brief, p. 14.
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Essentially, "commencement date" means the first day work is done on the project,
whether there is a contract in place for that work or not. In this case, Teufel's "commencement
date" was June 14, 2004, the first day a shovel hit the ground at Tamarack Resort.
1.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's Claim of Lien Did Not
Have Priority Over Credit Suisse's Mortgages.

Credit Suisse properly cites the long-standing precedent in Idaho for determining priority
for mechanic's liens; however, it then incorrectly applies that law to the facts in this case.
Specifically, Credit Suisse cited a 1907 case, Valley Lumber & A1fg. Co. v. Driessel, 13 Idaho
662, 93 P. 765 (1907), for the proposition that "work knowingly provided under a separate and
distinct contract cannot tack to an earlier contract."!!

Credit Suisse, however, completely

overlooks this Court's most recent decision on this issue, Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v.
Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P .3d 379 (2011), holding that if a project is one
improvement, the priority date need not "tack," but rather it is when the mechanic's lien claimant
first contributes to that one improvement. !d. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385.
a. Were the District Court's Factual Findings Regarding Teufel's Claim of
Lien Clearly Erroneous?
Teufel reiterates that the District Court made several erroneous factual findings regarding
the scope of Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort and the terms of Teufel's contract with
Tamarack. Credit Suisse disagreed.

11

See Respondent's Brief, p. 14.
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i.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's 'York at
Tamarack Resort was Under Four Separate Contracts and Not a
Continuous Single Contract?

The evidence at trial established that Teufel had one continuous contract with Tamarack
and this evidence was uncontroverted by Credit Suisse. Furthermore, in its Respondent's Brief,
Credit Suisse failed to address the issues raised in Teufel's Appellant's Brief, but rather it
focused on the incorrect and erroneous findings of the District Court. For example, Credit Suisse
seemed to hang its hat on the District Court's erroneous findings based upon the Affidavit of
Rick Christensen, a document that was not admitted into evidence and could not be considered
by the District Court. There is no dispute that the Affidavit of Rick Christensen was not entered
or admitted as evidence in the Tamarack trial, yet, the District Court relied upon the Affidavit to
. erroneous fim d'mgs. 12
rnak e Its
According to Idaho Code § 9-101, courts can take judicial notice of the following facts:
1. The true signification of all English words and phrases, and oflegal
expressIons.
2. Whatever is established by law.
3. Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of this state and of the United States.
4. The seals of all the courts of this statc and of the United States.
5. The accession to office and the official signatures and seals of office ofthe
principal officers of government in the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of this state and of the United States.
6. The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every state or sovereign
recognized by the executive power of the United States.
7. The seals of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of notaries
public.
8. The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions and
political history of the world. In all these cases the court may resort for its aid to
appropriate books or documents of reference.

12 See Substitute Omnibus Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Validity, Priority and Amount of Various
Liens and Mortgage Claims, p. 21 CR., p. 3841).
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I.e. § 9-101. Courts cannot, however, take judicial notice of pleadings filed in a case that were
not ultimately admitted at trial. The testimony of witnesses "shall be taken orally in open court
unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, or other
rules adopted by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." I.R.C.P.43(a). There is simply no statute or rule
that allows a court to rely upon documentary evidence not admitted at the trial when making its
factual findings.
While Idaho does not have a specific case on point, it is well settled only evidence that
was actually admitted or considered by judicial notice can be considered at trial. For example,
when answers to interrogatories are not offered and admitted at trial, they are not to be
considered as evidence in the case. Crollard v. Crollard, 104 Idaho 189, 190-91, 657 P .2d 486,
487-88 (Ct. App. 1983). The Court of Appeals set forth its analysis as to why such unadmitted
evidence could not be considered as follows:
Answers to interrogatories are not part of the pleadings and they are not
considered evidence unless introduced as such at trial. It has been held that error
sufficient to reverse a judgment occurs when a judge has used interrogatories that
have not been introduced into evidence, to establish a fact by inference. . ..
Moreover, in our view, answers to interr6gatories do not become incorporated
into evidence in a trial merely by allusion, indirect reference or physical presence
before the court during the questioning of a witness. None of these circumstances
suffices as a substitute for the application of the rules of evidence to establish the
admissibility of the answer - especially where a party is precluded, by a judge's
post-trial decision to treat the answers as evidence, from the opportunity to voice
an objection to such evidence and to obtain a ruling thereon. . .. Consequently,
we hold there was no competent evidence introduced at trial. ..
Id. at 191, 657 P.2d at 488 (citations omitted).

Credit Suisse failed to offer any response to the portion of Teufel's Appellant's Brief
setting forth all of the clearly erroneous factual findings of the District Court. Rather, Credit
Suisse simply reiterated the District Court's erroneous findings based on the Affidavit of Rick
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Christensen, followed by selective citations to the trial transcript that ignored Christensen's clear
testimony on point that Teufel was the single landscaper, working on a single project for
Tamarack Resort, and that the yearly agreements were merely reiterations of the overall contract
with specific unit prices for materials that varied from year to year. The facts Credit Suisse (and
the District Court) overlooked included:
•

Teufel was hired by Tamarack in 2004 as the exclusive landscape company for
Tamarack Resort and installed all of the landscaping at Tamarack Resort. (Tr., Vol.
II, pp. 239-40, 11. 24-25,1-14; p. 543,11.17-22)

•

Tamarack represented that the project would be a multi-year project and it was
Tamarack's intent to have one single landscape provider. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 254,11.3-18)

•

Tamarack did not have a landscaping plan or other landscape specifications. This
made drafting a multiyear contract impossible because there was no plan to provide
the basis for the contract. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 236,11. 7-22)

•

Landscape Construction Agreements were drafted based on an established unit price
and time and material basis for that year's pricing. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 256, 11. 22-24)

•

The yearly agreements were a continuation of the work of each prior agreement. (Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 260, 11. 13-18)

•

The 2004 Landscape Construction Agreement was extended in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 540, 11. 4-14)
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•

Christensen testified that the landscape agreements (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003,
9:004) were not "separate or individual contracts with Tamarack Resort" but rather "it
was just a modification ofthe original document." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 296, 11. 20_25)13

•

Christensen and Chris Kirk both testified that Teufel worked continuously from June
2004 through August of 2008, never actually discontinuing making improvements to
Tamarack Resort in that time. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 545, 11. 15-18; Tr. Vol. II, p. 294, 11. 618,p. 296, 11. 17-19)

It was undisputed that there was no intent by Tamarack or Teufel that more than one

contract governed Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort. Credit Suisse failed to introduce any
evidence to controvert the testimony of either Christensen or Tamarack's project manager, Chris
Kirk.

To the contrary, Credit Suisse cited the testimony of Kirk in its Respondent's Brief

summarizing Teufel's agreements 14 , but Credit Suisse failed to cite the testimony whereby Kirk
affinned that Teufel was hired as the general landscaper for all of Tamarack Resort, (Tr., Vol. II,
p. 538, 11. 3-7), that Teufel was never fired as the general landscaper for Tamarack Resort, (Tr.,
Vol. 11., p. 540, 11. 4-14), the 2005 agreement was an extension of the 2004 agreement, (Tr., Vol.
II, p. 540, 11. 4-8), and that the scope and amount of work Teufel did for Tamarack Resort did
not shift and change from year to year. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 543,11. 23-25)

13 Notably, despite the fact that the District Court relied on the Affidavit of Rick Christensen to "contradict" this
clear testimony given at trial, the Affidavit of Rick Christensen does not actually contradict the testimony at trial.
The Affidavit was offered in summary judgment proceedings and the paragraphs relied upon by the Court (and
adopted by Credit Suisse in their Respondent's Brief) were foundational only and meant to provide background to
introduce the documents for summary judgment purposes. The District Court actually relied on the Affidavit of
Rick Christensen to deny Credit Suisse's motion for summary judgment. (R., p. 2809).
14 Credit Suisse cited Kirk's testimony on cross-examination that Teufel needed to lock in their fees from year to
year and this is why individual agreements were drafted from year to year. (See Respondent's Briefp. 17, and Tr.,
Vol. 11., p. 546,11. 8-13).
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Credit Suisse then dedicated the next six pages of its Respondent's Brief on the "plain
language" of the agreements, incorrectly concluding that they were separate contracts. Credit
Suisse, however, failed to identify any evidence in the record or trial transcript to rebut the
following:
•

The 2004 Landscape Constmction Agreement included language that stated, "[ s]uch
other tasks as may be directed by the Owner's Representatives," a catchall phrase that
allowed Teufel to perform duties outside of the strict letter of the agreement. (Tr. Ex.
9:001)

•

The 2005 Landscape Constmction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:002), states that unit prices
for tasks will be provided in Exhibit "B." Exhibit B provides a spreadsheet of the
plants and materials for the anticipated work in 2005. Page 3 of Exhibit B has one
column that is not identified in the Scope of Work, titled "Overall Site." This catchall
category allocated plants to Tamarack Resort as a whole.

•

Teufel worked through 2005 on every part of the Tamarack Resort. (Tr. Ex. 9:042;
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 266-272) As testified by Christensen and Kirk, Teufel completed
work on every aspect and in every location within the Tamarack Resort in 2004 and
2005. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 277, 11. 2-18, pp. 543-44, ll. 23-25, 1-3)

•

The 2006 Landscape Constmction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:003) states that unit prices
for tasks will be provided in Exhibit "B" that included a column for "Spring-Fall
overa11l row screening, etc."

•

Teufel's work went well outside the bounds of the Scope of Work in the 2006
Landscape Constmction Agreement. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 543-44,11.23-25, 1-3)
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It

The 2007 Landscape Construction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:004) included a "Spring other plantings" provision in the Scope of Work, which also demonstrates the intent
to work outside of the enumerated areas in the Scope of Work.

Moreover, the plain language of the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Landscape Construction
Agreements demonstrates that the contracts were extensions of previous contracts.

Credit

Suisse failed to rebut or explain the following tenns in each ofthe continuation agreements:
I)

In the 2005 Landscape Construction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:002), the Scope of Work
includes work such as, "1. Finish landscape installation for 20 Twin Creek Chalets
and Rock Creek Cottages ... 3.

Complete landscaping for Entry & Whitewater

Roundabouts ... " (emphasis added).

This is a clear indicator that the work was

ongoing, unifonn and one part of the same improvement.
It

The 2006 Landscape Construction Agreement has similar language: "Complete the
landscape for the Bayview Sales Mod ... Supplement landscaping at Discovery
Village," (Tr. Ex. 9:003)

•

The 2007 Landscape Construction Agreement required the "Completion of Golden
Bar Townhomes (balance) ... " (emphasis added). (Tr. Ex. 9:004)

Furthennore, most of the projects themselves were multi-year endeavors. For example,
Teufel's work at Golden Bar was first placed in the Scope of Work in 2005 and included in 2006
and 2007.

Other areas which spanned multiple years include Discovery Village, Discovery

Chalets, Golf and Snow Maintenance Buildings, Golf Course, Staircase Chalets, Arling Center,
and Steelhead Chalets.

(Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004)

The plain language of the

agreements combined with the undisputed testimony of Kirk and Christensen that this was one
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project, one improvement with no variance to the scope and nature of work confirms that the
District Court made the clearly elToneous factual finding that Teufel had four separate and
distinct contracts with Tamarack.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial clearly establish that Teufel worked at
Tamarack Resort under one contract, which was extended through 2007. Credit Suisse failed to
point to any substantial or competent evidence in the record that would support the District
Court's elToneous findings.

Thus, Teufel's priority date was June of 2004 when it initially

commenced work at Tamarack Resort, making it prior to the date Credit Suisse recorded its
mortgages.

ii.

Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel Only
Maintained a Skeletal Crew and Not Perform Landscaping or
Improvements at Tamarack Resort During the Winter Months or
That Snow Removal Work Was Not Part of the Scope of Work for
Teufel's Landscaping Contract?

Credit Suisse failed to point this Court to any evidence in the record that would refute the
clear testimony at trial that Teufel never left Tamarack during the winter months. Rather, Credit
Suisse simply cited to the District Court's clearly elToneous factual finding that Teufel "only
maintained a skeletal crew at the Resort during the winter months.,,15 Credit Suisse failed to
address the following substantial, competent, and uncontroverted evidence:
..

The only time period Teufel did not have a crew present at Tamarack Resort was
December 22, 2004, to April 19, 2005.

•

The evidence presented at trial clearly established that Teufel had a full crew on site
from April 19, 2005, through December 31,2007, and into 2008.

15

See Respondent's Brief, p. 25.
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•

Christensen explained, "[S]ome of what we did, an important part of what we did is
allowed for other construction to proceed. So if we weren't there, it literally could
have brought the project to a halt. So that's why it was important for us to continue
on." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 334, 11. 7-12)

In addition, Credit Suisse reiterated the District Court's erroneous finding that the winter
work was non-landscaping, citing the testimony of Mike Stanger, one of Teufel's witnesses.
Mike Stanger testified that "one crew in 2007, the winter of 2007, ... was directly assigned to
clearing snow for construction of the Trillium Cottages and Trillium Townhomes." (Tr., Vol. II,
pp. 518-19,11.24-15,1-2) However, Mike Stanger's next sentence stated, "[a]nd we had another
crew working in the Staircase Chalets ... and that work was again pathways and walkways." (Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 519, 11. 2-3) This testimony was further supported by Trial Exhibit 9:047, the daily
force accounts for January 2007. The work at the Staircase Chalets entailed far more than snow
removal. Soil was graded on January 2, 2007, steps and pavers were installed on January 3,
2007, and grading continued on January 4,2007. (Tr. Ex. 9:047) Teufel does not dispute that it
performed snow removal at Tamarack Resort during January 2007; however, it did far more than
snow removal as the evidence, both documentary and oral,16 amply demonstrated. 17 There is
simply no evidence to support the District Court's tInding, rendering the finding clearly
erroneous.
It was undisputed at trial that Teufel performed substantial work at the request of

Tamarack outside the Scope of \Vork listed in each Landscaping Construction Agreement,

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 518-19,11. 24-25,1-3; p. 255, 11. 8-17; p. 295, 11. 4-9.
See Appendix A to Appellant's Brief, setting forth all work done by Teufel during the winter months at Tamarack
Resort, which clearly demonstrates that the work was not insignificant or the crews "skeletal."
16

17
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during the winter months. This work was billed at a time and hourly basis to Tamarack. (e.g.
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 344-45, 11. 7-25, 1-8) (Tr. Exs. 9:041, 9:043, 9:045, 9:047) Because Teufel
performed substantial work outside the Scope of Work from 2004 to 2007 under a time and
material basis, there is an unbroken chain of work done outside of the Scope of Work for which
it was specific contractual obligation, except for the "anticipation of future transaction." See
Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 849, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960 (2004). The work

provided on an open account outside of the contractual obligations is lienable and supports the
lienability of the contractual work. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 849, 851,
87 P.3d 955,960 (2004).
The four exhibits that encompassed all of the work orders and daily force accounts for the
work done at Tamarack Resort by Teufel, Trial Exhibits 9:041, 9:043, 9:045 and 9:047, provide
ample evidence that Teufel was performing work both within and outside of the Landscaping
Construction Agreements, and that Teufel maintained a steady and continuous presence at
Tamarack Resort year round. There is no evidence to support the District Court's contrary
findings, thus the District Court's findings are clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
b. Based Upon the Factual Findings, Should the District Court's
Conclusions of Law be Reversed?

The District Court erred when it found that Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort was under
four separate contracts, rather than one single contract and one single improvement. Based upon
these erroneous findings, the District Court then made the incorrect legal conclusion that Credit
Suisse's mortgages were prior to Teufel's Claim of Lien. Credit Suisse failed to cite any Idaho
case law that would support its position that Teufel's claim of lien did not have priority over its
mortgages.
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i.

Did the District Court Incorrectly Determine That Teufel and
Tamarack Were Not Operating Under an Open Account?

Credit Suisse properly cited the Idaho authority on open accounts, namely Franklin
Building Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960 (2004). However, it then

went on to incorrectly state that in Idaho, only materialmen, not laborers, are entitled to maintain
open accounts. 18 There is simply no basis in law for such an assertion. To the contrary, an open
account is:
Simply an account with a balance which has not been ascertained. The account is
kept open in anticipation of future transaction. Where an open account exists that
parties are deemed to intend that individual items on the account will not be
viewed separately but the account will be considered as a connected series of
transactions.
Id.

Credit Suisse provided no response to Teufel's assertion that it maintained an open
account for its work at Tamarack Resort for all work done outside of the scope and letter of the
agreements. It was completely uncontroverted that all of the work Teufel performed outside of
the contract from June 2004 to 2008 was performed as Tamarack dictated. There was no set
amount of work, or a total amount to be paid or even a comprehensive plan any given year. (Tr.,
Vol. II, pp. at 8:9-22; 38:2-8; 66:15-25; Tr. Ex. 9:040A)
As Teufel operated at Tamarack Resort under an open contract, all of its work constituted
a single improvement and its priority relates back to the first date that Teufel provided labor or
materials to Tamarack Resort, June 14, 2004.

I.e. §45-506;

kIu!. Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855 (2001).

Again, this legal premise was completely

overlooked by Credit Suisse in its Respondent's Brief
18

See Respondent's Brief, p. 27.
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see Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington

ii.

Did the District Court Err Concluding That Teufel's Priority Date
'Vas in 2007 and That Credit Suisse's Mortgages \Vere Prior to
Teufel's Claim of Lien?

Credit Suisse cited no legal authority to support its position that Teufel's priority date
was in 2007 because that Teufel had already been paid for its work in 2004,2005 and 2006. The
District Court detennined that in order for Teufel's work to relate back to 2004, "the work must
have been such to constitute a continuous single agreement." (R., p. 3838) (citing Terra- West,
Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010)).

While the District Court

properly cited Terra-West for this proposition, the District Court misapplied the law to the facts
of this case. This Court exercises free review over the District Court's legal conclusions.
As pointed out in Appellant's Brief, this Court recently issued a decision with facts very
similar to the Tamarack matter in Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC,
151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379 (2011).

Like this case, Hopkins addressed the scope of an

improvement for a landscaping company like the improvements Teufel contributed to the
Tamarack Resort. In Hopkins this Court expressly held that, "the labor and materials provided
were for the benefit of the entire golf course and driving range, rather than for the individual
improvements making up the golf course. Therefore, the golf course project is more properly
characterized as a single improvement." Id. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. The ruling in Hopkins is
equally applicable here. Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort constituted a single improvement, as
Teufel has asserted since the commencement of its foreclosure action.

The Landscape

Construction Agreements clearly state that the Project is the General Landscaping Work at
Tamarack Resort, just as the contractor in Hopkins was to construct an 18 hole golf course and
practice range. Teufel's work was divided into components covering all of Tamarack Resort,
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like the work was divided into thirteen components in Hopkins. Thus, just as this Court ruled
that the contractor's work in Hopkins constituted a single improvement, Teufel's work at
Tamarack Resort constituted a single improvement.
Credit Suisse failed to point to any substantial or competent evidence that disputed the
fact that Teufel performed work over every portion of Tamarack Resort each year. (Tr. Exs.
9:040, 9:040A, 9:042, 9:044, 9:046; Tr., Vol. II, pp. 543-44, 11. 23-25, 1-5) Teufel's work at
Tamarack Resort constituted a continuous improvement that benefited the entire resort. Under
Hopkins, Teufel's work did not cease and start over every year, and Teufel improved
substantially all of Tamarack Resort continuously, rendering its work a single improvement. (Tr.
Ex.9:040A)
Moreover, Teufel's work outside of the substantial completion dates further supports a
conclusion that there was a continuous agreement. Each Landscape Construction Agreement
states that Teufel must commence work at Tamarack Resort as of the date of the Landscape
Construction Agreement and "shall achieve substantial completion of the entire Work not later
than ... " (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004) Testimony during trial reflected that Teufel did
not meet these deadlines. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 253, 11. 1-5) Instead of suing Teufel for a breach of
contract for failing to meet the substantial completion dates, Tamarack directed Teufel to move
fOf'Nard with the work after the substantial completion dates under the same terms Teufel had
been working. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 272-73, 11. 23-25, 1-4)
Finally, and even more informative, is the language used in the 2005, 2006 and 2007
Landscaping Agreements to describe the identified work; "Finish landscape installation ... ,"
"Complete landscaping ... ," (Tr. Ex. 9:002), "Supplemental landscaping ... ," "Completion of
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the landscape .... " (Tr. Ex. 9:003), and "Completion of Golden Bar Townhomes." (Tr. Ex.
9:004) (emphasis added).

This plain language points to the parties' intent that Teufel

continuously work on Tamarack Resort as a single, contiguous improvement.
Because the District Court erroneously found that Teufel had four separate contracts with
Tamarack, it incorrectly concluded that Teufel's priority date was in 200i 9 , and ultimately
concluded that Credit Suisse's mortgages were prior to Teufel's Claim of Lien. This Court
exercises free review over conclusions of law, and given the errors of the District Court in this
case, this Court should reverse the District Court and find that Teufel's Claim of Lien is superior
to the Credit Suisse mortgages.
2.

Did the District Court Err in Calculating the Lien Amount?

The District Court improperly reduced Teufel's lien amount after the trial and further
adopted the incorrect interest calculation in formulating Teufel's overall amount due.
a. Did the District Court improperly eliminate a portion of Teufel's lien
amount?

Teufel presented substantial and competent evidence that the amount of its claim of lien
that had priority over Credit Suisse's mortgages totaled $406,199.07.

The District Court

improperly reduced that amount to $306,543.30. (R., pp. 3842-46)20 The District Court based

19 Again, contrary to Idaho law, the District Court and Credit Suisse both reason that Teufel had been paid for its
work in 2004, 2005 and 2006, thus it could only lien for its 2007 work.
20 Teufel's original claim oflien totaled $564,560.23. (Tr. Ex. 9:006) The claim oflien included an allocation of
amounts by area of the Tamarack Resort where the improvements were made. Although Teufel was not paid for any
of the work covered by the claim of lien, Teufel was required to partially release its lien as to certain parcels of
property within the Tamarack Resort because its prior attorney failed to name the property owners in the original
complaint. These partial releases only released Teufel's lien priority for those amounts, but did not extinguish the
actual amount Tamarack owed Teufel for the improvements. Teufel obtained a monetary judgment against
Tamarack for the entire amount owed, plus costs and attorney's fees. The lien amount relating to priority over
Credit Suisse's mortgages is the only issue in dispute for this appeal.
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its decision to reduce the amount of the claim of lien for parcels that were not allocated to any
one parcel, inappropriately negating almost $100,000 of Teufel's claim oflien.
Generally, if a claim of lien covers multiple properties or improvements, the lien claimant
is required to allocate its lien among the various properties or improvements. I.C. § 45-508. The
statute states:
In every case in which one (1) claim is filed against two (2) or more buildings,
mines, mining claims, or other improvements, owned by the same person, the
person filing such claim must, at the same time, designate the amount due him on
each of said buildings, mines, mining claims, or other improvement; otherwise the
lien of such claim is postponed to other liens. The lien of such claim does not
extend beyond the amount designated as against other creditors having liens by
judgment, mortgage, or otherwise, upon either of such buildings, or other
improvements, or upon the land upon which the same are situated.
I.C. § 45-508. However, if the work constitutes one improvement, such as landscaping for an
entire project, the claim of lien does not fall under the requirements of I.e. § 45-508. Hopkins,
151 Idaho at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. This Court has further reiterated:
The purpose of Idaho's mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes, Chapter 5,
Title 45, Idaho Code, ("lien law") is to compensate persons who perform labor
and provide materials for improvements to or upon real property. See generally
BMC West Corp. v. Horkiey, 144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03
(2007). In Idaho, "[mJaterialman's lien laws are construed liberally in favor of the
person who performs labor upon or furnishes materials to be used in the
construction of a building." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, such a right
is grounded in Idaho's Constitution, which provides that "[t]he legislature shall
provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanics, laborers, and material men
an adequate lien on the subject matter of their labor." Idaho Const. art. XIII, § 6.
Id. at 744,264 P.3d at 383. Although "improvement" is not defined in the lien law, this Court in
Hopkins was abundantly clear that grading, filling, leveling, or otherwise improving ground was

distinguished from improvements to buildings and structures. Id. If the improvements are made
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to the land as a whole, it is more properly characterized as a single improvement and not bound
by the allocation requirements in I.C. § 45-508. Id. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385.

In this case, the District Court invalidated portions of Teufel's Claim of Lien because the
retention fees and erosion control amounts were not allocated to specific parcels of property.
(R., p. 3846) Credit Suisse failed to direct this Court to any authority supporting the District
Court's erroneous decision. Notably, Teufel was not required to allocate its Claim of Lien to
such a mathematical certainty between the parcels at Tamarack.

(See Hopkins discussion,

supra). The District Court stated that Teufel had met its burden of proof on the information

contained in Exhibit 9:056 21 , but then it still reduced the lien for the erosion control and retention
amounts, because "the item did not relate to any specific parcel for which foreclosure was
sought." (R., p. 3846, fns. 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 90) The District Court improperly
determined that these parcels "were not subject to the lien" because they were not attached to
specific parcels or part of the "property" owned by Tamarack. Id.

In all, the District Court

subtracted $99,655.77 from Teufel's lien amount based on its lack of specificity in the lien,
contrary to Idaho law. 22 Credit Suisse simply glossed over this fact and stated that Hopkins did
not apply to Teufel because the Tamarack Resort "was not like a single project like a golf
course. ,,23
Further, Credit Suisse incorrectly stated in its Respondent's Brief that Teufel could not
explain why there was discrepancy with the dollar amounts in the final calculation at trial and in

Trial Exhibit 9:056 is attached to Appellant's Brief as Appendix 1.
See I.e. § 45-508, and Hopkins, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379.
23 See Respondent's Brief. p. 30.

21

22
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the previously filed trial brief or lien disclosures?4 To the contrary, Christensen specifically
testified that the "erosion control" amount was mistakenly left out of the calculation "because it
couldn't be pigeonholed to a parcel, so it was just left off when, in fact, it deserved to be
included." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 475, 11. 21-24) He further testified that "retention" amounts were also
left out of the previous disclosure for the same reason, that they were not attributable to anyone
specific parcel. (Tr., Vol. II, 11. 3-17) Christensen went on to testify that the amount of the lien
was $406,199.07, which went completely uncontradicted by Credit Suisse. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 497,

1. 1)
Because Teufel's lien need not be allocated in order to maintain validity and priority, this
Court should reverse the District Court's reduction in the lien amount and reinstate Teufel's
Claim of Lien in the amount of $406,199.07 as sought, and proven, at trial.

b. Did the District Court Err in its Calculation of Interest?
The District Court incorrectly adopted Credit Suisse's interest calculation, which is not
supported by Idaho law.

Credit Suisse argued that Teufel's rate of interest should be variable

because this is the rate the District Court applied to the other lien claimants in the overall
Tamarack Litigation?5
Teufel contracted with Tamarack to install landscaping at Tamarack Resort. Pursuant to
the Paragraph 6.4 of the Landscape Construction Agreement:
Payments due and unpaid under this Agreement shall bear interest
from the date payment is due at a per annum rate equal to the
prime rate published by Wells Fargo Bank in Boise, Idaho plus two
percent (2%).
For the same reason it was inappropriate for the District Court to rely upon the Affidavit of Rick Christensen, it
was equally inappropriate for the District Court to rely on the Trial Brief as substantive evidence at the trial when
the trial brief was not admitted into evidence. See argument supra, p. pp. 8-11.
25 See Respondent's Brief, p. 37.
24
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Paragraph 6.4 is found in the Landscape Construction Agreements for 2004, 2005, 2006 and
2007. (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004) There was no reference to a variable interest rate in
any of the Landscape Construction Agreements. Under the terms of the Landscape Construction
Agreements, Paragraph 6.2.1, "payments shall be made by Owner no later than twenty (20) days
after the Landscape Architect receives the Application for Payment." These calculations were
provided to the District Court, yet it did not adopt the prejudgment interest calculation according
to the Landscape Construction Agreements.

Rather, the District Court erroneously adopted

Credit Suisse's interest calculation citing its prior rulings in other mechanic's lien claims that the
interest rate should be variable. This finding, however, is not supported by Teufel's Landscape
Construction Agreements, which do not cite to a variable interest rate. (R., p. 4240) Credit
Suisse failed to provide any legal authority explaining why it would be appropriate for the
District Court to deviate from the plain language of the Landscape Construction Agreements.
Accordingly, the District Court's interest calculation should be reversed and Teufel's
calculations should be applied.
3. Did the District Court Err in Apportioning Teufel's Costs and Attorney
Fees?
The District Court improperly apportioned Teufel's costs and attorneys' fees.

Idaho

Code § 45-513 states, in pertinent part, "the court shall also allow as part of the costs the moneys
paid for filing and recording the claim, and reasonable attorney's fees."

This has been

interpreted to mean that "a successful lien claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees
incurred in foreclosure proceedings." Perception Constr. l\1gmt. v. Bell, 151 Idaho 250, 254
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P.3d1246 (2011).

As Teufel successfully established its lien and its right to foreclose, it is

entitled to attorney fees under I.C. §45-513.
Credit Suisse argued that because Teufel's claim of lien was not given priority over
Credit Suisse's mortgages, a forty percent (40%) reduction in its fees were appropriate. Notably,
Credit Suisse did not argue that if Teufel is ultimately granted priority by this Court, Teufel's
costs and attorneys' fees were unreasonable or unnecessary. Credit Suisse simply reiterated the
"prevailing party" analysis and argued that the District Court was within its discretion to
apportion fees based on the priority issue.
Furthermore, the District Court did not make any findings that Teufel's attorneys' fees
and costs were unreasonable. Thus, if the District Court's decision regarding priority between
Teufel and Credit Suisse is reversed, Teufel should be awarded all of its costs and fees.
Consequently, Teufel would be entitled to costs as a matter of right in the amount of $4,239.23,
discretionary costs in the amount of $8,843.27 and attorneys' fees in the amount of $270,942.00,
for a total of $284,024.50.
III.

CONCLUSION

This appeal presents issues of both fact and law. The District Court made erroneous
factual findings which resulted in it making incorrect conclusions of law when it determined that
Credit Suisse's mortgages had priority over Teufel's claim of lien. After reviewing the Record,
the Trial Transcript, and the Trial Exhibits, it should be apparent that the District Court's factual
findings were clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial or competent evidence. Credit
Suisse failed to direct this Court to any substantial or competent evidence or legal authority to
support the District Court's findings and conclusions.
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Consequently, Teufel respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the District Court's erroneous findings of fact, and determine as a
matter of law that Teufel's Claim of Lien has lien priority over Credit Suisse's mortgages, and
the amount of Teufel's lien is $406,199.07, plus prejudgment interest as set forth herein,
including all of Teufel's costs and attorneys' fees sought below.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _-"----'_ day of July, 2013.

PICKENS LAW, P.A.

By:
Terri R. Pickens, ofthe firm
Attorneys for Teufel Nursery, Inc.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this - - - day of July, 2013, I caused to be served two
true and accurate copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF by placing the same in the United
States mail, First Class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Bruce Badger
Fabian Clendenin
215 S. State, Ste. 1200, Ste. 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323
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